Integer Programming and Arrovian Social Welfare Functions
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References listed on IDEAS
- Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
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- Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-1037, July.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
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"Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures,"
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Tonin, Simone, 2014. "Nondictatorial Arrovian Social Welfare Functions: An Integer Programming Approach," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-21, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Simone Tonin, 2017. "Nondictatorial Arrovian Social Welfare Functions, Simple Majority Rule and Integer Programming," Working Papers 2017_11, Durham University Business School.
- Pycia, Marek & Ünver, M. Utku, 2015. "Decomposing random mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 21-33.
- Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Tonin, Simone, 2014. "Integer Programming on Domains Containing Inseparable Ordered Paris," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-22, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
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- repec:eee:reecon:v:72:y:2018:i:4:p:428-434 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsSocial welfare function; impossibility theorem; single-peaked domain; linear programming;
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