Implementation of Social Welfare Functions
A social welfare function f assigns to each economic environment p a continuous preorder f(p) on the space of allocations of private goods. f is implementable if for each large finite set Z the correspondence Phi (p) defined by selecting the set of f(p)-maximal allocations in Z is implementable. Then fis implementable only if it satisfies Arrow's independence axiom. Therefore, every implementable social welfare function is constant or dictatorial or inversely dictatorial. If f(p) is merely quasitransitive and f satisfies a basic nonimposition condition then f is oligarchical if it is implementable. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 33 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297|
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598 Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:33:y:1992:i:3:p:525-33. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.