Implementation of Social Welfare Functions
A social welfare function f assigns to each economic environment p a continuous preorder f(p) on the space of allocations of private goods. f is implementable if for each large finite set Z the correspondence Phi (p) defined by selecting the set of f(p)-maximal allocations in Z is implementable. Then fis implementable only if it satisfies Arrow's independence axiom. Therefore, every implementable social welfare function is constant or dictatorial or inversely dictatorial. If f(p) is merely quasitransitive and f satisfies a basic nonimposition condition then f is oligarchical if it is implementable. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 33 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297|
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598 Email: |