Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0253-0
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- Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Choosers as extension axioms," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(4), pages 375-384, October.
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