Report NEP-DES-2022-11-07This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.
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Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Paola B. Manasero & Jorge Oviedo, 2022. "General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model," Papers 2210.06549, arXiv.org.
- Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions," Papers 2209.13148, arXiv.org.
- R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2022. "Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules," Papers 2210.11627, arXiv.org.
- Stefano Vannucci, 2022. "Agenda manipulation-proofness, stalemates, and redundant elicitation in preference aggregation. Exposing the bright side of Arrow's theorem," Papers 2210.03200, arXiv.org.
- Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2022. "Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt," Working Papers 2022-12, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Yao Luo & Peijun Sang & Ruli Xiao, 2022. "Order Statistics Approaches to Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions," Papers 2210.03547, arXiv.org.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-02400053, HAL.