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Report NEP-DES-2022-11-07
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Paola B. Manasero & Jorge Oviedo, 2022, "General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2210.06549, Oct.
- Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Clayton Thomas, 2022, "Strategyproofness-Exposing Descriptions of Matching Mechanisms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2209.13148, Sep, revised Oct 2025.
- R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2022, "Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2210.11627, Oct.
- Stefano Vannucci, 2022, "Agenda manipulation-proofness, stalemates, and redundant elicitation in preference aggregation. Exposing the bright side of Arrow's theorem," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2210.03200, Oct.
- Jason Allen & Jakub Kastl & Milena Wittwer, 2022, "Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2022-12, Mar.
- Yao Luo & Peijun Sang & Ruli Xiao, 2022, "Order Statistics Approaches to Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2210.03547, Oct.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022, "Long Information Design," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-02400053, DOI: 10.3982/TE4557.