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Report NEP-DES-2019-10-21
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura, 2019, "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13967, Aug.
- Pycia, Marek & Troyan, Peter, 2022, "A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14043, Jan.
- Yoan Hermstrüwer, 2019, "Transparency and Fairness in School Choice Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, number 2019_11, Aug.
- Vincenzo Atella & Francesco Decarolis, 2019, "Procuring Medical Devices: Evidence from Italian Public Tenders," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 472, Oct, revised 10 Oct 2019.
- Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Brent R. Hickman & Eric Richert, 2022, "Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1422, Jul.
- Crosetto, P. & Filippin, A. & Katuscak, P. & Smith, J., 2019, "Central tendency bias in belief elicitation," Working Papers, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), number 2019-04.