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Boundedly rational backward induction

Author

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  • Ke, Shaowei

    (Department of Economics, University of Michigan)

Abstract

This paper proposes simple axioms that characterize a generalization of backward induction. At any node of a decision tree, the decision maker looks forward a fixed number of stages perfectly. Beyond that, the decision maker aggregates continuation values according to a function that captures reasoning under unpredictability. The model is uniquely identified from the decision maker's preference over decision trees. Confronting a decision tree, the decision maker iteratively revises her plan for the future as she moves forward in the decision tree. A comparative measure of unpredictability aversion and several examples are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Ke, Shaowei, 2019. "Boundedly rational backward induction," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
  • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:2402
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Benjamin Patrick Evans & Mikhail Prokopenko, 2024. "Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: the quantal hierarchy model of decision making," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(1), pages 71-111, February.
    3. Andrzej Baranski & Ernesto Reuben, 2023. "Competing for Proposal Rights: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 20220085, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Mar 2023.
    4. Rampal, Jeevant, 2022. "Limited Foresight Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 166-188.
    5. Benjamin Patrick Evans & Mikhail Prokopenko, 2021. "Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: The Quantal Hierarchy model of decision-making," Papers 2106.15844, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    6. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Timothy Flannery & Cara Sibert, 2022. "Learning from Forced Completion vs. the Option to Opt Out," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 9(1), pages 65-102, April.
    8. Eichberger, Jürgen & Pasichnichenko, Illia, 2021. "Decision-making with partial information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic choice; imperfect foresight; time inconsistency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General

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