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Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned

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  • Ishida, Wataru
  • Park, Changwoo

Abstract

We introduce the problem of allocating objects when society is partitioned into groups of agents, each collectively owning a number of objects equal to its size. We propose a new axiom, called “within-group endowments lower bounds”, which requires that each agent find his assignment at least as desirable as his least preferred object among those owned by the group to which he belongs. We identify and characterize a family of rules satisfying this axiom in addition to efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and group-wise neutrality. We also consider two core notions, the “standard core” and the “exclusion core” (Balbuzanov and Kotowski, 2019). Our finding is that they are independent notions, unlike in traditional ownership structures (e.g., collective, private, and mixed ownership), and that our proposed rules always recommend allocations in their intersection.

Suggested Citation

  • Ishida, Wataru & Park, Changwoo, 2026. "Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 287-309.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:155:y:2026:i:c:p:287-309
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.003
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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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