Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and no monetary transfers are allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy desirable properties from an economic and social point of view. In addition to strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, we consider consistency and two solidarity properties (replacement-domination and population-monotonicity). In most of the cases, these properties are satisfied only by serially dictatorial rules.
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Volume (Year): 30 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: November 1999/Final version: December 2001|
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