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A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games

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  • Bertrand Tchantcho
  • Lawrence Diffo Lambo

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  • Bertrand Tchantcho & Lawrence Diffo Lambo, 2008. "A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 533-542, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:37:y:2008:i:3:p:533-542
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0317-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    2. Andjiga, Nicolas G. & Moulen, Joel, 1988. "Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 189-201, October.
    3. Peleg,Bezalel, 2008. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521074650.
    4. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
    5. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Denicolo Vincenzo, 1993. "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Correspondences and Social Decision Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 324-332, April.
    8. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    9. Roland Pongou & Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2008. "Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(3), pages 555-574, June.
    10. John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
    11. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Simple game; Social choice correspondence; Implementation; Core; Simple game; C62; C70; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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