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Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters

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  • Bezalel Peleg
  • Hans Peters

Abstract

In this chapter we extend the model of Chapters 9 and 10 to a classical voting system with still finitely many alternatives (candidates) but with very many voters. Such a system is representative of political elections on the local or national level. As an, in our view, best approximation we model voters as elements of a non-atomic measure space. In particular, this approach allows us to accommodate the fact that in such voting systems single voters have negligible influence on the final outcome, and to avoid potential combinatorial complexities of a model with a large but finite number of voters.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2006. "Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 493-493, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:493-493
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0174-3
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    1. Hart, Sergiu & Kohlberg, Elon, 1974. "Equally distributed correspondences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 167-174, August.
    2. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    3. Peleg,Bezalel, 2008. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521074650.
    4. Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2010. "Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Strategic Social Choice, chapter 0, pages 123-145, Springer.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-161, January.
    7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2010. "Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Strategic Social Choice, chapter 0, pages 123-145, Springer.
    2. Bezalel Peleg, 2013. "Consistent Voting Systems Revisited: Computation and Axiomatic Characterization," Discussion Paper Series dp649, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2013. "Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00666816, HAL.
    4. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans, 2017. "Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 254-261.
    5. Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2013. "Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 631-634, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General

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