Consistent Voting Systems Revisited: Computation and Axiomatic Characterization
We add two results to the theory of consistent voting. Let M be the set of all survivors of some feasible elimination procedure. We prove that i) M can be computed in polynomial time for each profile of preferences and ii) M is characterized by anonymity, non- imposition, Maskin monotonicity, and additive blocking.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem|
Web page: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Pattanaik, Prasanta K, 1978. "On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 163-170, January.
- Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-161, January.
- Holzman, Ron, 1986. "On strong representations of games by social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 39-57, February.
- Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2002.
"Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp308, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Peters Hans & Peleg Bezalel, 2002. "Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters," Research Memorandum 024, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- B Pezaleleleg & Hans Peters, 2006. "Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 477-492, December.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Oren, Ishai, 1981. "The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 207-220, October.
- Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2006. "Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 493-493, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp649. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tomer Siedner)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.