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Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions

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  • Peters, H.J.M.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Schröder, M.J.W.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Vermeulen, A.J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information with respect to the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation, i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) for any preference profile.

Suggested Citation

  • Peters, H.J.M. & Schröder, M.J.W. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2013. "Ex post Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions," Research Memorandum 049, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013049
    DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2013049
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    2. Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2010. "Strategic Social Choice," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-13875-1, December.
    3. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 267-287, March.
    6. Boros, Endre & Elbassioni, Khaled & Gurvich, Vladimir & Makino, Kazuhisa, 2010. "On effectivity functions of game forms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 512-531, March.
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