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A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise

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  • Joseph M. Abdou

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Hans Keiding

    (UCPH - University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet)

Abstract

We view political activity as an interaction between forces seeking to achieve a political agenda. The viability of a situation depends on the compatibility of such agendas. However even in a conflictual situation a compromise may be possible. Mathematically a political structure is modeled as a simplicial complex and a viable configuration as a simplex. A represented compromise is a viable configuration obtained by the withdrawal of some agents in favor of some friendly representatives. A delegated compromise is a sophisticated version of a compromise obtained by the iteration of the withdrawal process. Existence of such solutions depends on the discrete topology of the simplicial complex. In particular we prove that the existence of a delegated compromise is equivalent to the strong contractibility of the simplicial complex.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph M. Abdou & Hans Keiding, 2018. "A Qualitative Theory of Conflict Resolution and Political Compromise," Working Papers hal-01796062, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01796062
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01796062v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Oksana Ivanivna Myhalets, 2020. "Semantic Peculiarities of the Verbs with the Highest Degree of Polysemy Denoting Conflict Actions," Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Richtmann Publishing Ltd, vol. 9, May.
    2. Andrea Mock & Ismar Volic, 2021. "Political structures and the topology of simplicial complexes," Papers 2104.02131, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    3. Mock, Andrea & Volić, Ismar, 2021. "Political structures and the topology of simplicial complexes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 39-57.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Delegation; compromise; simplicial complex; contiguity; strong homotopy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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