Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization
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- Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 1999. "Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization," Discussion Papers 99-21, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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- Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 2006. "Binary effectivity rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(3), pages 167-181, December.
- Keiding, Hans & Peleg, Bezalel, 2006.
"On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 42(7-8), pages 827-842, November.
- Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 2003. "On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions," Discussion Papers 03-30, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Hans Keiding & Bezalel Peleg, 2003. "On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions," Discussion Paper Series dp324, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Sinan Ertemel & Levent Kutlu & M. Remzi Sanver, 2015. "Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 187-201, June.
- Peleg, Bezalel, 2004. "Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 275-287, May.
More about this item
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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