The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights
Using a simple bilateral trading example with discrete valuations and costs it is demonstrated that in the presence of private information the efficiency of Coasean bargaining may be strictly enhanced if initially no property rights are assigned.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in European Journal of Law and Economics 1.11(2001): pp. 23-28|
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- Illing, Gerhard, 1992. "Private Information as Transaction Costs: The Coase Theorem Revisited," Munich Reprints in Economics 19522, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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