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What to put in the table

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  • Nicolas Figueroa
  • Vasiliki Skreta

Abstract

This paper investigates under which circumstances negotiating simultaneously over multiple issues or assets helps reduce inefficiencies due to the presence of asymmetric information. We find that a simultaneous negotiation over multiple assets that are substitutes reduces inefficiencies. The effect is stronger if goods are heterogeneous, and in this case the inefficiency can be eliminated altogether. When assets are not substitutes inefficiencies always prevail. We also study cases where co-ownership is possible (partnerships), allowing for asymmetric distributions, general valuation functions and for multiple assets. We show that efficient dissolution is possible if all agents valuations at their types where gains of trade are minimal are equal. For this to hold, the agent that most likely has the highest valuation for a given asset should initially own a bigger share of that asset. We discuss implications of these findings for the design of partnerships and joint ventures. JEL classification codes: C72, D82, L14.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "What to put in the table," Documentos de Trabajo 237, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:237
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    11. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexandre Janiak, 2008. "Welfare in models of trade with heterogeneous firms," Documentos de Trabajo 253, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    2. Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
    3. Stefano Galavotti, 2014. "Reducing Inefficiency in Public Good Provision Through Linking," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 427-466, June.
    4. , R. & , D., 2011. "A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
    5. Viviana Fernández & Brian M. Lucey, 2008. "Emerging Markets Variance Shocks: Local or International in Origin?," Documentos de Trabajo 251, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
    7. Alexandre Janiak, 2008. "A large firm model of the labor market with entry, exit and search frictions," Documentos de Trabajo 245, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    8. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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