What to put in the table
This paper investigates under which circumstances negotiating simultaneously over multiple issues or assets helps reduce inefficiencies due to the presence of asymmetric information. We find that a simultaneous negotiation over multiple assets that are substitutes reduces inefficiencies. The effect is stronger if goods are heterogeneous, and in this case the inefficiency can be eliminated altogether. When assets are not substitutes inefficiencies always prevail. We also study cases where co-ownership is possible (partnerships), allowing for asymmetric distributions, general valuation functions and for multiple assets. We show that efficient dissolution is possible if all agents valuations at their types where gains of trade are minimal are equal. For this to hold, the agent that most likely has the highest valuation for a given asset should initially own a bigger share of that asset. We discuss implications of these findings for the design of partnerships and joint ventures. JEL classification codes: C72, D82, L14.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
| Length: | |
| Date of creation: | 2007 |
| Date of revision: | |
| Handle: | RePEc:edj:ceauch:237 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://www.dii.uchile.cl/cea/ More information through EDIRC
|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ornelas, Emanuel & Turner, John L., 2007.
"Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 187-199, July.
- John L. Turner & Emanuel Ornelas, 2004. "Efficient Dissolution of Partnerships and the Structure of Control," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 286, Econometric Society.
- Makowski, L. & Mezzetti, C., 1989.
"The Possibility Of Efficient Mechanisms For Trading In Indivisible Object,"
Papers
344, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio, 1993. "The Possibility of Efficient Mechanisms for Trading an Indivisible Object," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 451-465, April.
- Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981.
"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,"
Discussion Papers
469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
- Ferreira, Daniel & Ornelas, Emanuel & Turner, John L., 2007. "Unbundling Ownership and Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 6257, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001.
"The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights,"
MPRA Paper
6929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Patrick Schmitz, 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 23-28, January.
- Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, 2007. "How Are Firms Sold?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 847-875, 04.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & David T. Robinson & S. Viswanathan, 2007. "Efficient Mechanisms For Mergers And Acquisitions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 995-1035, 08.
- Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998.
- Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio, 1994. "Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 500-519, December.
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:237. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.