What to put in the table
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- Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2007. "What to Put on the Table," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000374, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "What to Put on the Table," Working Papers 08-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Stefano Galavotti, 2014.
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More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-16 (All new papers)
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