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The private provision of excludable public goods: An inefficiency result

  • Ellingsen, Tore
  • Paltseva, Elena

Does voluntary contracting suffice for the efficient provision of excludable public goods? Even in a complete information environment, we find that the answer is negative. The reason is that some agents may profit from not participating at the provision stage, but instead negotiate access ex post.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272712000588
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 96 (2012)
Issue (Month): 9-10 ()
Pages: 658-669

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:9:p:658-669
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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