The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. A canonical example for a public good that is produced with a direct provision technology is Open Source Software.
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin F. Hellwig, 2003.
"Public-Good Provision with Many Participants,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 589-614, 07.
- d'Aspremont, Claude & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998.
"Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 389-404, November.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & BHATTACHARYA, Sudipto & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1356, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- D'Aspremont, C. & Bhattacharya, S. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1993. "Knowledge as a Public Good: Efficient Sharing and Incentives for Development Effort," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 93a18, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July.
- Werner Güth & Martin Hellwig, 1986.
"The private supply of a public good,"
Journal of Economics,
Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 121-159, December.
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981.
"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,"
469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Peter Norman, 2004.
"Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188, October.
- Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008.
"Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods,"
NBER Working Papers
13797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2010. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 1-37, November.
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1441R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2006.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Neeman, Zvika, 2000. "The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 309-26, April.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2000. "Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 318-342, June.
- ROBERTS, John, .
"The incentives for correct revelation of preferences and the number of consumers,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-272, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Roberts, John, 1976. "The incentives for correct revelation of preferences and the number of consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 359-374, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jep:wpaper:05007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Gall)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.