The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents
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Other versions of this item:
- Behringer, Stefan, 2008. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents," MPRA Paper 11796, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsMechanism design; public goods; open source software;
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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