Overcoming Participation Constraints
In incomplete information environments with transferable utility, efficient outcomes are generally implementable unless interim or ex post participation constraints are imposed on the problem. In this paper we show that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but possibly unrelated social decisions, a slightly perturbed Groves mechanism can implement an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, while respecting all participation, incentive and balanced budget constraints.
|Date of creation:||22 Apr 2005|
|Date of revision:||28 Apr 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/|
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