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The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents

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  • Behringer, Stefan

Abstract

This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern information technologies.

Suggested Citation

  • Behringer, Stefan, 2008. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents," MPRA Paper 11796, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11796
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11796/1/MPRA_paper_11796.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 389-404, November.
    2. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2010. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 1-37, November.
    3. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 351-367.
    4. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    5. Martin F. Hellwig, 2003. "Public-Good Provision with Many Participants," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 589-614.
    6. Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    7. Roberts, John, 1976. "The incentives for correct revelation of preferences and the number of consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 359-374, November.
    8. Werner Güth & Martin Hellwig, 1986. "The private supply of a public good," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 121-159, December.
    9. Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188.
    10. Ehud Lehrer & Zvika Neeman, 2000. "The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 309-326.
    11. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2000. "Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 318-342, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Goods; Direct Provision; Asymmetric Information; Mechanism Design; Open Source Software;

    JEL classification:

    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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