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Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern

  • Patrick W. Schmitz

    (Universität Universität Bonn, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Bonn, Deutschland)

  • Dirk Sliwka

    (Universität Bonn, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Bonn, Deutschland)

Die Rolle von privater Information in der Kontraktheorie wird anhand einfacher Tauschmodelle beleuchtet. Es wird zwischen den Konsequenzen von asymmetrischer Information vor und nach Vertragsabschluß unterschieden und jeweils der Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit der Verhandlungsprozeß von Bedeutung und die effiziente Lösung erreichbar ist. Ziel des Artikels ist es, einem breiten Leserkreis einen Einblick in Methoden und Ergebnisse der diesbezüglichen Forschungsarbeiten zu ermöglichen.

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Article provided by Institute of SocioEconomics in its journal Homo Oeconomicus.

Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 233-243

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Handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1998:p:233-243
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  1. Patrick Schmitz, 1998. "Randomization in coalition contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 341-353, March.
  2. Rob, Rafael, 1989. "Pollution claim settlements under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 307-333, April.
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Samuelson, William F, 1984. "Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 995-1005, July.
  5. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April.
  7. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
  9. Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June.
  10. Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July.
  11. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
  12. John G. Riley & Richard Zeckhauser, 1980. "Optimal Selling Strategies:," UCLA Economics Working Papers 180, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1996. "Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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