Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001.
"Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
- Patrick Bajari & Steven Tadelis, 1999. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," Working Papers 99029, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2007. "Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 182-186, May.
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1992.
"Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 600-614, June.
- Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1989. "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences," Discussion Papers 850, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1990. "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 215, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Ching-To Albert Ma, 1994.
"Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(1), pages 109-129.
- Ching-to Albert Ma, 1990. "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts," Papers 0004, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Ma, C.A., 1991. "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts," Papers 29, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
- Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999.
"Implementation and Renegotiation,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56.
- Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1998. "Implementation and renegotiation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19350, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999.
"Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1998. "Foundations of incomplete contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19354, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 6726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Georg Noeldeke & Klaus Schmidt, 1998.
"Sequential Investments and Options to Own,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 633-653, Winter.
- Nöldeke, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," CEPR Discussion Papers 1645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Klaus Schmidt, 1998. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," CESifo Working Paper Series 160, CESifo.
- Nöldeke, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "Sequential investments and options to own," Munich Reprints in Economics 19327, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002.
"On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999.
"Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
- Che, Y.K. & Hausch, D.B., 1997. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," Working papers 9714, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006.
"Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997.
"The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
- Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," NBER Working Papers 5744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hart, Oliver D. & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, R. W., 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," Scholarly Articles 30727607, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1778, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Williamson, Oliver, 2009.
"The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract,"
Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 111-134, December.
- Oliver E. Williamson, 2002. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 171-195, Summer.
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, September.
- William P. Rogerson, 1992. "Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 777-793.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002.
"Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- De Fraja, Gianni, 1999. "After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 22-39, January.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2009.
"Information and the hold‐up problem,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 405-423, September.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Katz, Michael L, 2009. "Information and the Hold-Up Problem," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt782315gb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Kurtis Swope & Ryan Wielgus & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan, 2011.
"Contracts, Behavior, and the Land-assembly Problem: An Experimental Study,"
Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability, pages 151-180,
Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Kurtis Swope & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan & Ryan Wielgus, 2010. "Contracts, Behavior, and the Land-Assembly Problem:An Experimental Study," Departmental Working Papers 29, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021.
"On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers 15970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," MPRA Paper 106947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012.
"The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 841-843.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," MPRA Paper 43407, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 9050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Du, Wenjing & Fang, Guanfu & Gao, Tiantian & Jiang, Wei, 2023. "Public credit institutions, export activities, and global value chain participation: Evidence from China's credit demonstration city construction program," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012.
"Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 642-645.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," CEPR Discussion Papers 9065, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 53717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Patrick W Schmitz, 2022.
"How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts,"
The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(647), pages 2563-2577.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrea Fosfuri & Christian Helmers & Catherine Roux, 2017. "Shared Ownership of Intangible Property Rights: The Case of Patent Coassignments," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 339-369.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010.
"Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mori, Yusuke, 2020. "Ex ante investment, ex post adaptation, and joint ownership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007.
"Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?,"
Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 7/2006, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010.
"Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006.
"Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005.
"Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 26/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023.
"The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 18208, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 117742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012.
"The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 841-843.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," MPRA Paper 43407, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 9050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011.
"Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2009. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008.
"Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 268-271, December.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013.
"Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," MPRA Paper 41730, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 9141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008.
"Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 577-580, June.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002.
"On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alan Schwartz, 2004.
"The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
- Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, "undated". "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003.
"Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April.
- Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances," CEPR Discussion Papers 2698, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2001.
"Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017.
"Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," MPRA Paper 90801, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002.
"Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014.
"Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 21-24.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 91457, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 10110, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
Keywords
Hold-up problem; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6322. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.