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Shared Ownership of Intangible Property Rights: The Case of Patent Coassignments

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  • Andrea Fosfuri
  • Christian Helmers
  • Catherine Roux

Abstract

We show that the legal rules regarding the ability of co-owners of patents to license the patented technology to third parties have important implications not only for licensing, the diffusion of the patented technology, and hence downstream competition but also for the decision to share ownership in the first place. The legal rules that regulate shared ownership also affect efforts provided by the parties at the invention stage and hence impact the quality of the patented technology. We rely on exogenous legal differences between the United States and Europe concerning the ability of co-owners of patents to license the patented technology to third parties to show that the data are consistent with our theoretical predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Fosfuri & Christian Helmers & Catherine Roux, 2017. "Shared Ownership of Intangible Property Rights: The Case of Patent Coassignments," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 339-369.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/694919
    DOI: 10.1086/694919
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    Cited by:

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    3. Shantala Samant & Jongwook Kim, 2021. "Determinants of common benefits and private benefits in innovation alliances," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(2), pages 294-307, March.

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