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Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?

  • Oechssler, Jörg

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg)

  • Roider, Andreas

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg)

  • Schmitz, Patrick W.

    ()

    (Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Universität Köln)

Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour coolingoff period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.

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File URL: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/publications/dp08-06.pdf
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Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 08-06.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 16 Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:08-06
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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