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Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge

Author

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  • Ewerhart, Christian
  • Schmitz, Patrick W.

Abstract

The theory of contracts is one of the most active research areas in economics. While classic contract theory failed to account for institutions such as property rights and authority, the theory of incomplete contracts has overcome these conceptual problems and produced a variety of interesting applications. This paper studies some of these applications. We discuss the management of research and developement activities, privatization, and the division of labor within the government. While the foundations of the theory of incomplete contracts are still a matter of dispute, the applications proved to be very successful and provided many new and exciting insights.

Suggested Citation

  • Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6943
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6943/1/MPRA_paper_6943.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    2. Hart, Oliver D, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 119-139, Spring.
    3. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Opening the black box of innovation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 701-710, April.
    4. Schmidt, Klaus M, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-24, April.
    5. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728.
    6. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
    7. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1027-1054.
    8. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1996. "Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Seabright, Paul, 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Schmitz, 1998. "Randomization in coalition contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 341-353, March.
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations

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