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Digital Technology and the Allocation of Ownership in the Music Industry

Listed author(s):
  • Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka
  • Tobias Regner

    ()

We apply the property rights theory of Grossman-Hart-Moore in the music industry and study the optimal allocation of copyright between the artists who create music and the labels who promote and distribute it. Digital technology opens up a role for new intermediaries. We find that entry of online platforms occurs only if they are sufficiently more productive in distribution than the incumbent label. Furthermore, entry leads to a change in bargaining positions and it can become optimal for the copyright to be shifted from the label to the artist. (Updated from working paper 04/096)

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File URL: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2009/wp228.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series The Centre for Market and Public Organisation with number 09/228.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:09/228
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