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Repeated Implementation

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  • Kalai, Ehud
  • Ledyard, John

Abstract

In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.

Suggested Citation

  • Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John, 1997. "Repeated Implementation," Working Papers 1027, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1027
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    File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1027.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
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    15. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1998. "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(6), pages 1353-1388, November.
    3. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," MPRA Paper 48234, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Jul 2013.
    4. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Partially-honest Nash Implementation with Non-connected Honesty Standards," Discussion Paper Series 633, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    5. Joel Watson, 2007. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 55-81, January.
    6. Tharakunnel, Kurian & Bhattacharyya, Siddhartha, 2009. "Single-leader-multiple-follower games with boundedly rational agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1593-1603, August.
    7. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    8. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Repeated implementation and complexity considerations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(4), pages 271-293, February.
    9. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2016. "Treading a Fine Line : (Im)possibilities for Nash Implementation with Partially-honest Individuals," Discussion Paper Series 651, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    10. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    11. Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 367-382, January.
    12. Chambers, Christopher P., 2004. "Virtual repeated implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 263-268, May.
    13. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2015. "Repeated Implementation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 518, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    14. Azacis, Helmuts, 2017. "Repeated Implementation with Overlapping Generations of Agents," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2017/16, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    15. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017. "Treading a Â…fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Working Papers SDES-2017-14, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.

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