IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

False Reputation in a Society of Players

  • Matthew O. Jackson

    (California Institute of Technology)

  • Ehud Kalai

    (Northwestern University)

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be maintained in a society if the same repeated game is played recurringly by many different groups and each group observes the play paths of the earlier groups? We argue that such false reputations must die out over time. To prove this in environments that allow for rich (uncountable) sets of types of players, we combine ideas of purification with recent results from the rational learning literature.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9711/9711004.ps.gz
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9711/9711004.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9711004.

as
in new window

Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 25 Nov 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9711004
Note: Type of Document - postscript; prepared on pc-latex; to print on Postscript; pages: 21; figures: one. comments welcome
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine.
  2. John Nachbar, 2010. "Prediction, Optimization and Learning in Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 576, David K. Levine.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May.
  4. E. Kalai & E. Lehrer, 2010. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 529, David K. Levine.
  5. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  6. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  8. Jordan J. S., 1993. "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 368-386, July.
  9. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  10. Matthew Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Recurring Bullies," Discussion Papers 1151, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Dean Foster & Peyton Young, . "Learning with Hazy Beliefs," ELSE working papers 023, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  12. Nyarko, Yaw, 1994. "Bayesian Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibria in Normal Form Games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(6), pages 821-41, October.
  13. Matthew Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Discussion Papers 1138, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1991. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 981, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 1997. "Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 116-134, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9711004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.