Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
This paper shows that, in many infinitely repeated games, if players optimize with respect to beliefs that satisfy a diversity condition termed neutrality, then each player will choose a strategy that his opponent was certain would not be played. This is an obstacle to formulation of a learning theory in which Nash equilibrium behavior is a necessary long-run consequence of optimization by cautious players.
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Volume (Year): 65 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
- Lawrence Blume & David Easley, 1993. "Rational Expectations and Rational Learning," Game Theory and Information 9307003, EconWPA.
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