IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games

  • John H. Nachbar

    (Washington University, St. Louis)

Consider a two-player discounted repeated game in which each player optimizes with respect to prior beliefs about his opponent's repeated game strategy. One would like to argue that if beliefs are cautious then players will learn as the game unfolds to predict the continuation path of play. If this conjecture were true then a convergence result due to Kalai and Lehrer would imply that the continuation path would asymptotically resemble the path of a Nash equilibrium. One would thus have constructed a theory which predicts Nash equilibrium as the necessary long-run consequence of optimization by cautious players. This paper points out that there is an obstacle to such a result in the form of a potential conflict between prediction and optimization.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9504/9504001.pdf
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9504/9504001.tex
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9504/9504001.ps.gz
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9504001.

as
in new window

Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 11 Apr 1995
Date of revision: 14 Feb 1996
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9504001
Note: Postscript from AMS-LaTeX, 46 pages
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Lawrence Blume & David Easley, 1993. "Rational Expectations and Rational Learning," Game Theory and Information 9307003, EconWPA.
  2. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
  3. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9504001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.