Prediction, Optimization and Learning in Repeated Games
Consider a two-player discounted repeated game in which each player optimizes with respect to prior beliefs about his opponent's repeated game strategy. One would like to argue that if beliefs are cautious then players will learn as the game unfolds to predict the continuation path of play. If this conjecture were true then a convergence result due to Kalai and Lehrer would imply that the continuation path would asymptotically resemble the path of a Nash equilibrium. One would thus have constructed a theory which predicts Nash equilibrium as the necessary long-run consequence of optimization by cautious players. This paper points out that there is an obstacle to such a result in the form of a potential conflict between prediction and optimization.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988.
"Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
- Ehud Kalai & William Stanford, 1986. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 679, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
- Lawrence Blume & David Easley, 1993. "Rational Expectations and Rational Learning," Game Theory and Information 9307003, EconWPA.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:576. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.