Bayesian Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibria in Normal Form Games
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- Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2000. "Relative entropy in sequential decision problems1," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 425-439, May.
- Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 1997. "Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 116-134, January.
- Yoo, Seung Han, 2014. "Learning a population distribution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 188-201.
- Dean Foster & Peyton Young, "undated". "Learning with Hazy Beliefs," ELSE working papers 023, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Nyarko, Yaw, 1997. "Convergence in Economic Models with Bayesian Hierarchies of Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 266-296, June.
- Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
- Müller, Stephan, 2014. "The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 219, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1997. "False Reputation in a Society of Players," Discussion Papers 1184R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 1998. "Mutual Observability and the Convergence of Actions in a Multi-Person Two-Armed Bandit Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 405-424, October.
- Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2002. "Calibration and Bayesian learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 103-119, October.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1999. "Reputation versus Social Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 40-59, September.
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