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Non-Bayesian Learning

  • Epstein Larry G

    ()

    (Boston University)

  • Noor Jawwad

    ()

    (Boston University)

  • Sandroni Alvaro

    ()

    (University of Pennsylvania)

A series of experiments suggest that, compared to the Bayesian benchmark, people may either underreact or overreact to new information. We consider a setting where agents repeatedly process new data. Our main result shows a basic distinction between the long-run beliefs of agents who underreact to information and agents who overreact to information. Like Bayesian learners, non-Bayesian updaters who underreact to observations eventually forecast accurately. Hence, underreaction may be a transient phenomenon. Non-Bayesian updaters who overreact to observations eventually forecast accurately with positive probability but may also, with positive probability, converge to incorrect forecasts. Hence, overreaction may have long-run consequences.

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Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-20

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:3
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  1. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 1998. "Learning from Neighbours," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 595-621.
  2. Sandroni, Alvaro, 1998. "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 121-147, January.
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  6. Larry G. Epstein & Alvaro Sandroni, 2003. "Non-Bayesian Updating : A Theoretical Framework," RCER Working Papers 505, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  7. Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 1997. "Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 116-134, January.
  8. Larry G. Epstein & Jawwad Noor & Alvaro Sandroni, 2008. "Supplementary Appendix for ‘Non-Bayesian Updating: A Theoretical Framework’," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-017, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  9. Larry Epstein, 2005. "An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating," RCER Working Papers 521, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  10. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-40, September.
  11. Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler, 2008. "Probability and Uncertainty in Economic Modeling," Post-Print hal-00463394, HAL.
  12. Camerer, Colin F, 1989. "Does the Basketball Market Believe in the 'Hot Hand'?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1257-1261, December.
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  14. S. Nageeb Ali, 2009. "Learning Self-Control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000384, David K. Levine.
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