Supplementary Appendix for ‘Non-Bayesian Updating: A Theoretical Framework’
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References listed on IDEAS
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- repec:eee:mateco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:90-104 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kwon, Seokbeom & Motohashi, Kazuyuki, 2017. "How institutional arrangements in the National Innovation System affect industrial competitiveness: A study of Japan and the U.S. with multiagent simulation," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 221-235.
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- Sun, Lan, 2016. "Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 557, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- KWON Seokbeom & MOTOHASHI Kazuyuki, 2015. "How Institutional Arrangements in the National Innovation System Affect Industrial Competitiveness: A study of Japan and the United States with multiagent simulation," Discussion papers 15065, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
More about this item
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2008-05-24 (Central Banking)
- NEP-GTH-2008-05-24 (Game Theory)
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