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Belief Error and Non-Bayesian Social Learning: Experimental Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Boğaçhan Çelen

  • Sen Geng

  • Huihui Li

Abstract

This paper experimentally studies whether individuals hold a first-order belief that others apply Bayes’ rule to incorporate private information into their beliefs, which is a fundamental assumption in many Bayesian and non-Bayesian social learning models. We design a novel experimental setting in which the first-order belief assumption implies that social information is equivalent to private information. Our main finding is that participants’ reported reservation prices of social information are significantly lower than those of private information, which provides evidence that casts doubt on the first-order belief assumption. We also build a novel belief error model in which participants form a random posterior belief with a Bayesian posterior belief kernel to explain the experimental findings. A structural estimation of the model suggests that participants’ sophisticated consideration of others’ belief error and their exaggeration of the error both contribute to the difference in reservation prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Boğaçhan Çelen & Sen Geng & Huihui Li, 2019. "Belief Error and Non-Bayesian Social Learning: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2019-07-08, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
  • Handle: RePEc:wyi:wpaper:002471
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    Cited by:

    1. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Müller, Stephan & Pourbabaee, Farzad & Tamuz, Omer, 2025. "The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(1), January.
    2. Wolff, Irenaeus & Folli, Dominik, 2024. "Why is belief–action consistency so low? The role of belief uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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