Virtual Repeated Implementation
We show that in the context of repeated implementation, any social choice rule which realizes all alternatives for a positive (yet arbitrarily small) amount of time is Nash implementable. The results complement those of the virtual implementation literature.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published: published in Economic Letters 83 (2004) pp. 263-268.|
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- Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John, 1997.
1027, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Eric Maskin, 1998.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
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Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
- Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July.
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