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A társadalombiztosítási nyugdíjrendszerek mint közjószágok
[Social-insurance pension systems as public goods]

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  • Mészáros, József

Abstract

A tanulmány bemutatja, hogy a módszertani individualizmus feltevésével élve és az ismételt játékok apparátusát alkalmazva, a jelenlegi társadalombiztosítási nyugdíj rendszerek többszörös fogolydilemma-játék típusú helyzetben vannak. Ennek jellem zésére a tanulmányban három állítást fogalmazunk meg és bizonyítunk be: a demog ráfiai, a járulékfizetési és a politikai osztály dilemmáját. A dilemmák bizonyítása az ismételt játékok elméletének úgynevezett Selten tételével történik. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: C72, H41, H55, I39, J78.

Suggested Citation

  • Mészáros, József, 2005. "A társadalombiztosítási nyugdíjrendszerek mint közjószágok [Social-insurance pension systems as public goods]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 275-288.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:752
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • I39 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Other
    • J78 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Public Policy (including comparable worth)

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