Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable
In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.
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- Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993.
"Learning Mixed Equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, June.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1998.
"Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1817, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998.
"Learning in Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2222, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
- Benaim, Michel & Hirsch, Morris W., 1999. "Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 36-72, October.
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