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Mediators in position auctions

  • Ashlagi, Itai
  • Monderer, Dov
  • Tennenholtz, Moshe
Registered author(s):

    A mediator is a reliable entity which plays on behalf of the players who give her the right to play. The mediator acts in a pre-specified way based on messages received from the players. However, a mediator cannot enforce behavior; that is, players can play in the game directly without the mediator's help. A mediator generates a new game for the players, the mediated game. The outcome in the original game of an equilibrium in the mediated game is called a mediated equilibrium. Monderer and Tennenholtz introduced a theory of mediators for games with complete information. We extend the theory of mediators to games with incomplete information, and apply the new theory to position auctions, a central topic in electronic commerce. We provide a minimal set of conditions on position auctions, which is sufficient to guarantee that the VCG outcome function is a mediated equilibrium in these auctions.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 67 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 1 (September)
    Pages: 2-21

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:1:p:2-21
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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