Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case
Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.
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Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received March 1996/Revised version January 1997/Final version May 1997|
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