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Absorbing Team Games


  • Solan, Eilon


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  • Solan, Eilon, 2000. "Absorbing Team Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 245-261, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:31:y:2000:i:2:p:245-261

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Abraham Neyman & Sylvain Sorin, 1998. "Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 201-210.
    2. Vrieze, O J & Thuijsman, F, 1989. "On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(3), pages 293-310.
    3. von Stengel, Bernhard & Koller, Daphne, 1997. "Team-Maxmin Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 309-321, October.
    4. Bornstein, Gary & Winter, Eyal & Goren, Harel, 1996. "Experimental study of repeated team-games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 629-639, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eilon Solan, 2000. "The Dynamics of the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence and n-Player Stochastic Games," Discussion Papers 1311, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016. "Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    3. Eilon Solan & Rakesh V. Vohra, 1999. "Correlated Equilibrium, Public Signaling and Absorbing Games," Discussion Papers 1272, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

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