Quantified Beliefs and Believed Quantities
That people estimate quantities, or have beliefs about them, is a daily observable phenomenon. People also quantify their beliefs, at least in theory, by ascribing to them probability numbers. It is shown that quantified beliefs and estimations give rise to the same model, that of a type space, and can therefore be viewed as the two sides of the same coin. We study the axiom that an agent's estimation of his own estimation is correct, showing it to be weaker than the introspection axiom, according to which an agent is certain of his own probabilistic beliefs. It implies, however, that the agent is certain that he is introspective, and it is equivalent to the axioms of averaging and conditioning, which are expressed in terms of probabilistic beliefs.
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Game Theory and Information
9609002, EconWPA, revised 17 Sep 1996.
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