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Bayesian games: Games with incomplete information

  • Shmuel Zamir

    ()

An encyclopedia article on games with incomplete information. Table of contents: 1. Definition of the subject and its importance. 2. Introduction: Modeling incomplete information. 3. Harsanyi’s model: The notion of type. 4. Aumann’s model. 5. Harsanyi’s model and the hierarchies of beliefs. 6. The Universal Belief Space. 7. Belief subspaces. 8. Consistent beliefs and Common prior. 9. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium. 10. Bayesian equilibrium and Correlated equilibrium. 11. Concluding remarks and future directions. 12. Bibliography.

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Paper provided by The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp486.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp486
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  1. Paul Milgrom & Nancy L.Stokey, 1979. "Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers 377R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  3. AUMANN, Robert J., . "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP -167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Aviad Heifetz & Dov Samet, 1996. "Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs," Game Theory and Information 9609002, EconWPA, revised 17 Sep 1996.
  5. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1105-1125, 07.
  6. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Heifetz, Aviad & Mongin, Philippe, 2001. "Probability Logic for Type Spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 31-53, April.
  8. Mertens, J.-F., 1986. "Repeated games," CORE Discussion Papers 1986024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. MERTENS , Jean-François & SORIN , Sylvain & ZAMIR , Shmuel, 1994. "Repeated Games. Part A : Background Material," CORE Discussion Papers 1994020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 263-300.
  11. Robert J. Aumann, 1998. "Common Priors: A Reply to Gul," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 929-938, July.
  12. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  13. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  14. Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology II: Probability," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 301-314.
  15. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  16. Aumann, Robert J. & Heifetz, Aviad, 2002. "Incomplete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 43, pages 1665-1686 Elsevier.
  17. MEIER, Martin, 2001. "An infinitary probability logic for type spaces," CORE Discussion Papers 2001061, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  18. Vassilakis, Spyros & Zamir, Shmuel, 1993. "Common belief and common knowledge," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 495-505.
  19. Heifetz, Aviad, 1993. "The Bayesian Formulation of Incomplete Information--The Non-compact Case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 329-338.
  20. Nyarko, Yaw, 1991. "Most Games Violate the Harsanyi Doctrine," Working Papers 91-39, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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