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Bayesianism without Learning

Author

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  • Dov Samet

    (Faculty of Management Tel Aviv University)

Abstract

According to the standard definition, a Bayesian agent is one who forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that the agent acquires any certain information; an agent is Bayesian if his prior, when conditioned on his posterior belief, agrees with the latter. This condition is shown to characterize Bayesian models.

Suggested Citation

  • Dov Samet, 1999. "Bayesianism without Learning," Game Theory and Information 9902004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9902004
    Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 17
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/9902/9902004.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heifetz, Aviad & Samet, Dov, 1998. "Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 324-341, October.
    2. Samet, Dov, 2000. "Quantified Beliefs and Believed Quantities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 169-185, December.
    3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1997. "The Logic of Belief Persistence," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 39-59, April.
    4. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1985. "Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 608, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Iterated Expectations and Common Priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 131-141, July.
    6. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1997. "The Logic of Belief Persistence," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(01), pages 39-59, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Di Tillio, Alfredo & Halpern, Joseph Y. & Samet, Dov, 2014. "Conditional belief types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 253-268.
    2. , & ,, 2011. "Agreeing to agree," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
    3. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 100-121.
    4. Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2014. "Speculative trade under unawareness: the infinite case," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 147-160, October.
    5. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 100-121.
    6. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 100-121.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian updating; prior and posterior;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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