The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
The existence of a common prior is a property of the state space used to model the players' incomplete information. We show that this property is not just a technical artifact of the model, but that it is immanent to the players' beliefs. To this end, we devise a condition, phrased solely in terms of the players' mutual beliefs about the basic, objective issues ofpossible uncertainty, which is equivalent to the existence of a common prior. This condition specifies a procedure of enquiry addressed to the players, which detects when there is no common prior among them.
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- Aviad Heifetz & Dov Samet, 1996.
"Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs,"
Game Theory and Information
9609002, EconWPA, revised 17 Sep 1996.
- Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152.
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