IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade

  • Heifetz, Aviad
  • Meier, Martin
  • Schipper, Burkhard C.

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized “No-speculative-trade” theorem according to which there cannot be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we prove a generalization of the “No-agreeing-to-disagree” theorem.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612001352
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 77 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 100-121

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:100-121
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Galanis, Spyros, 2007. "Unawareness of theorems," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 51816, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  2. Morris, Stephen, 1995. "The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(02), pages 227-253, October.
  3. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C, 2011. "Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games," MPRA Paper 30220, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Heifetz, Aviad, 2006. "The positive foundation of the common prior assumption," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 105-120, July.
  5. Oliver Board, 2008. "Object-Based Unawareness: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 378, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2009.
  6. Galanis, Spyros, 2013. "Trade and the value of information under unawareness," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1313, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  7. Joseph Y. Halpern, 2000. "Characterizing the Common Prior Assumption," Game Theory and Information 0004009, EconWPA.
  8. Samet, Dov, 1999. "Bayesianism without learning," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 227-242, June.
  9. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2001. "Alternative Semantics for Unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 321-339, November.
  10. Harborne W. Stuart Jr. & Hong Hu, 2002. "An epistemic analysis of the Harsanyi transformation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 517-525.
  11. Spyros Galanis, 2011. "Syntactic foundations for unawareness of theorems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 593-614, October.
  12. HEIFETZ, Aviad & MEIER, Martin & SCHIPPER, Burkhard C., 2004. "Interactive unawareness," CORE Discussion Papers 2004059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C, 2009. "Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior," MPRA Paper 15058, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Martin Meier & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 219-249, June.
  15. Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 2012. "Inductive Reasoning About Unwareness," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151202, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
  16. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
  17. Halpern, Joseph Y. & Rego, Leandro Chaves, 2008. "Interactive unawareness revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 232-262, January.
  18. Paul Milgrom & Nancy L.Stokey, 1979. "Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers 377R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 1999. "How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 409-434.
  20. Kim-Sau Chung & Oliver Board, 2007. "Object-Based Unawareness," Working Papers 2007-2, University of Minnesota, Department of Economics, revised 24 Aug 2007.
  21. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2008. "A canonical model for interactive unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 304-324, January.
  22. Jing Li, 2008. "A Note on Unawareness and Zero Probability," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-022, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  23. Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Laura Veldkamp, 2008. "Information Acquisition and Under-Diversification," NBER Working Papers 13904, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. John Geanakoplos, 1989. "Game Theory Without Partitions, and Applications to Speculation and Consensus," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 914, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  25. Feinberg, Yossi, 2000. "Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 127-179, April.
  26. Dov Samet, 1997. "Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets," Game Theory and Information 9701002, EconWPA.
  27. Leandro Rêgo & Joseph Halpern, 2012. "Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 131-155, February.
  28. Ewerhart, Christian, 2001. "Heterogeneous Awareness and the Possibility of Agreement," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-30, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  29. Samet, Dov, 1990. "Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 190-207, October.
  30. Heinsalu, Sander, 2014. "Universal type structures with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 255-266.
  31. Thomas Leonard, 2008. "Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 356-360, December.
  32. Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2013. "Speculative Trade under Unawareness: The Infinite Case," Working Papers 102, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  33. Modica, Salvatore & Rustichini, Aldo, 1999. "Unawareness and Partitional Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 265-298, May.
  34. Heinsalu, Sander, 2012. "Equivalence of the information structure with unawareness to the logic of awareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2453-2468.
  35. Morris, Stephen, 1994. "Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1327-47, November.
  36. Li, Jing, 2009. "Information structures with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 977-993, May.
  37. Salvatore Modica, 2008. "Unawareness, priors and posteriors," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 81-94, November.
  38. Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 1998. "Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(1), pages 159-174, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:100-121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.