Alternative Semantics for Unawareness
Modica and Rustichini [Theory and Decision 37, 1994] provided a logic for reasoning about knowledge where agents may be unaware of certain propositions. However, their original approach had the unpleasant property that nontrivial unawareness was incompatible with partitional information structures. More recently, Modica and Rustichini [Games and Economic Behavior 27:2, 1999] have provided an approach that allows for nontrivial unawareness in partitional information structures. Here it is shown that their approach can be viewed as a special case of a general approach to unawareness considered by Fagin and Halpern [Artificial Intelligence 34, 1988].
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 263-300.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:2:p:321-339. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.