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Universal type structures with unawareness

  • Heinsalu, Sander

Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in standard games. A natural question is whether each hierarchy describes the playerʼs awareness of the hierarchies of other players and beliefs over these, or whether the reasoning can continue indefinitely. This paper constructs the universal type structure with unawareness where each type has an awareness level and a belief over types. Countable hierarchies are therefore sufficient to describe all uncertainty in games with unawareness.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825613001668
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 83 (2014)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 255-266

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:255-266
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.012
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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