Heterogeneous Awareness and the Possibility of Agreement
This paper explores the consequences of assuming that agents may be unaware of certain outcomes in the state space. One way to construct such a setting is from what we call awareness types. When agents possess limited awareness of the state space, information may be delusive, but agents can still not commonly believe to have different posteriors. The paper also discusses the properties of knowledge under limited awareness. E.g., it is shown that an ignorant agent\ is aware of his ignorance if and only if he knows that he is ignorant. When the state space is sufficiently rich, state awareness satisfies plausibility, AU-introspection, and KU-introspection.
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|Date of creation:||12 May 2001|
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|Note:||Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.|
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