Trade and the value of information under unawareness
The value of information and the possibility of speculation are examined in an environment with unawareness. Although agents have â€œcorrectâ€ prior beliefs about events they are aware of and have a clear understanding of their available actions and payoffs, their unawareness may lead them to commit information processing errors and to behave suboptimally. As a result, more information is not always valuable and agents can speculate with each other. We identify two specific information processing errors that are responsible for both problems. Moreover, we construct a dynamic model where agents announce their posteriors and update their awareness as soon as they hear a counterfactual announcement. We study how awareness is updated and whether agreement about posteriors is reached.
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